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 1 
A pension for injured victims of the Troubles: Reparations 
or Reifying Victim Hierarchy?* 
By Luke Moffett, School of Law, Queen’s University Belfast 
Abstract  
Reparations have been often used victim-centred measures to redress both private harm and 
gross violations of human rights. However, with the increasing occurrence of internal armed 
conflict and political violence, identities of victims and perpetrators in protracted conflicts 
can become blurred for some individuals. In countries like Peru and Northern Ireland that 
have suffered protracted violence, victimhood has been contested around which individuals 
are seen as innocent and deserving to exclude any members of non-state armed groups from 
claiming reparations. This article explores the issue of a proposed bill on a pension for 
injured victims of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. It identifies that there is no consistent 
state practice or human rights jurisprudence in this area, but instead offers a more complex 
approach through four models that can grapple with the seeming diametrically opposed 
victimhood and responsibility, by including victimised-perpetrators in reparations 
programmes such as that proposed for a pension of seriously injured victims in Northern 
Ireland. 
Introduction 
Dealing with the past in the aftermath of protracted violence or conflict is never easy, but 
defining who is a victim and who deserves reparations is a recurring challenge. The past three 
decades have seen a global proliferation of transitional justice mechanisms, including truth 
commissions, amnesties and reparations. Such mechanisms have not yet taken root in 
Northern Ireland, and were noticeably inconspicuous in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement – 
more a peace agreement than a transitional justice roadmap for dealing with the consequences 
of the past.  Although many victim and civil society groups in Northern Ireland have 
advocated for truth and justice,1 such efforts have only crystallised after successive judgments 
at the European Court of Human Rights, in particular for contentious deaths involving state 
forces under Article 2 on the right to life. As a result, institutions such as the Historical 
Enquiries Team were created and ordinary mechanisms like the coronial courts were 
reformed, but these were subsequently found to be inadequate in terms of both promptness 
and independence. Recent negotiations and agreements such as the 2014 Stormont House 
Agreement have reinforced the attention to truth and justice for those who were killed during 
the Troubles, but with little attention to reparations. 
                                                      
* Many thanks to Anna Bryson and Kieran McEvoy for their very helpful comments on this article. 
1 One particularly effective victim group has been those who family members were disappeared by 
Republican paramilitaries resulting in the establishment of the Independent Commission for the 
Location of Victims’ Remains (ICLVR). See Lauren Dempster, The Republican Movement, 
'Disappearing,' and Framing the Past in Northern Ireland, International Journal of Transitional Justice 
(forthcoming). 
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The focus on Article 2 compliance has ensured that discussions on the past have 
focused on deaths. This arguably narrows attention paid to victims of other crimes, such as 
sexual violence, physical assault, and torture. Indeed a significant constituency left out of the 
equation on the past are the 40,000 individuals who were injured during the Troubles, many 
of them seriously. The suffering of those seriously injured is worsening as they are getting 
older requiring carers and mobility assistance, unable to work and build up a pension, and are 
thus dependent on state benefits or the support of friends and families. The passage of time 
has compounded their problems as many suffer increasing physical distress, as a result of 
deteriorating health and chronic pain. Discussion of reparations in particular has become a 
controversial subject in Northern Ireland, going to the heart of narratives of the past of who is 
a victim and who is responsible for their harm. This has seen protests in the past, with 
compensation for killed paramilitaries labelled as ‘blood money’ or the ‘wages of murder’.2 
The Democratic Unionist Party have stated that, based on their consultation, the opinion of 
the ‘vast majority of innocent victims is that they would rather there be no pension provision 
than for perpetrators to benefit.’3 The 2014 Stormont House Agreement rather blandly stated 
that further work will be ‘undertaken to seek an acceptable way forward on the proposal for a 
pension for severely physically injured victims in Northern Ireland.’4 Given the ongoing 
impasse on the broader issues related to truth and justice (discussed elsewhere in this issue), 
the pension is now the only new process moving forward with DUP MLA Brenda Hale 
introducing a private member bill on the issue, perhaps as a cynical attempt to be ‘seen’ to do 
something on the past. 
This article examines the role of a proposed pension bill for seriously injured victims 
as a form of reparations. In particular it tries to unpack some of the contentious elements of 
victimhood and responsibility around who should be eligible for such a pension. It begins by 
briefly outlining the purpose of reparations in international law before discussing in more 
depth the controversy around contested identities and how other states have addressed the 
issue of victimised-perpetrators and the difficulties it has created in regional human rights 
courts. In particular this first section explores the private law basis of reparations in 
international law, legal provisions in states dealing with victimised-perpetrators, and the 
jurisprudence of human rights courts in reconciling principles of non-discrimination and 
remedy with responsibility of victimised-perpetrators. The second section discusses the 
Northern Ireland experience with financial reparations, noting that shortcomings in past 
compensation arrangements and the current prevailing service based approach, before briefly 
outlining the proposed pension for seriously injured victims. The final section explore 
                                                      
2 Owen Bowcott, ‘Protests Disrupt Launch of Northern Ireland Troubles Payout Proposals,’ The 
Guardian, 28 January 2009. 
3 DUP: We’d rather sink pensions scheme than see terrorists get cash, Newsletter, 20 March 2015. 
4 Para.28. 
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possible avenues and definitions that may help to traverse the difficult political landscape of 
victimised-perpetrators’ eligibility for a pension. 
Reparations in international law 
Reparations in international law are based in private law principles of seeking to return the 
victim to the status quo ante (original position) through restitutio in integrum (returning to the 
victim all they have lost), echoing equity and tort principles in domestic jurisdictions.5 This is 
a form of rectificatory or corrective justice that attempts to restore the equality between the 
injured and responsible party, through imposing a proportional penalty on the perpetrator 
commensurate to the harm caused so as to benefit the injured party.6 In international law the 
underlying principle for reparations is to ‘as far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of 
the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if 
that act had not been committed.’7  Reparations at least in human rights law are intended to 
acknowledge the harm suffered by victims and to induce those responsible to provide 
appropriate remedies. 
In the face of collective violence it is of course almost impossible to devise legal 
mechanisms that can deal fully with the consequence of such acts and hold all responsible to 
account. Moreover, returning a victim to their original position may put them back to a 
marginalised position, without tackling the causes of victimisation.8 Instead the purpose of 
reparations involves focusing upon attempting to improve life opportunities and quality of life 
for victims in ways that privilege their agency and choice through compensation and 
rehabilitation.9 In addition, preventing the recurrence of violations is of course a key concern 
of international law. Such preventative measures involve ‘making real’ the guarantees of non-
repetition which are a cornerstone of international human rights law. In practice this may 
entail a range of measures including  institutional reform, and redressing the structural causes 
of victimisation, as well as measures of satisfaction which publicly acknowledge and 
memorialise the victims’ suffering, such as apologies, memorials, and truth recovery 
processes, so that they can ‘awaken [...] public awareness to avoid repetition’, and ‘maintain 
                                                      
5 Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras, Judgment of July 21, 1989 (Reparations and Costs), paras.25-26; 
and Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece, para.34. Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International 
Human Rights Law, (OUP 2005) p9 and 65. 
6 Aristotle, Nicomechean Ethics, Book V; and William T. Blackstone, Reverse Discrimination and 
Compensatory Justice, Social Theory and Practice 3(3) (1975) 253-288. 
7 Germany v Poland, The Factory at Chorzow (Claim for Indemnity) (The Merits), Permanent Court of 
International Justice, File E. c. XIII, Docket XIV:I Judgment No. 13, 13 September 1928 (‘Chorzow 
Factory’ case), para.125.  
8 Heidi Rombouts and Stephan Parmentier, The International Criminal Court and its Trust Fund are 
Coming of Age: Towards a Process Approach for the Reparation of Victims, International Review of 
Victimology 16 (2009) 149–182. 
9 Such as the ‘proyecto de vida’ (life project) reasoning recognised for a time by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights in Loayza Tamayo v Peru, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of 27 November 
1998, Series C No. 42, paras.147-148. 
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remembrance of the victim.’10 In light of these limits, human rights law has over the past few 
decades developed five types of reparations to effectively remedy gross violations of human 
rights: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, measures of satisfaction, and guarantees of 
non-repetition,.11 
A further difficulty with reparations in international law and more political 
constructions in transitional justice is that they reflect a state-centric approach based on the 
state both as the main violator and as the entity with the greatest responsible for reparations. 
This is problematic for Northern Ireland, given that ‘perpetrators’ include both non-state and 
state actors and, leaving aside the issue of state collusion, the non-state actors were 
responsible for approximately 90% of all fatalities.12 Moreover, it means that members of 
non-state armed groups, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Ulster Defence 
Association (UDA) and Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), were victimised by other groups, but 
also subject to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment as well as extra-judicial killings (the 
so-called ‘shoot to kill’ policy), both directly and through state collusion with paramilitary 
organisations.13 This complex reality of violence and human rights abuses speaks directly to 
the limitations of what McEvoy and McConnachie have described as ‘monochramatic 
distinctions between universally innocent victims and guilty perpetrators.’14 As reparations 
programmes seek to demarcate and quantify forms of harms and victims as deserving of 
redress through definitions, such programmes become enmeshed in the political contests 
surrounding victimhood. 
Victim Hierarchies in Conflict and Transition 
Victimhood can be fiercely disputed in times of conflict and transition to peace. Combatants 
in armed conflicts can often portray themselves as collective victims and the ‘good guys’, 
innocent of any crime and deserving of sympathy and support.15 This is apparent in the 
                                                      
10 Principle 22, UNBPG; 19 Tradesmen v Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 109 
(IACtHR, 5 July 2004), paras.272-273; Myrna Mack-Chang v Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Series C No. 101 (IACtHR, 25 November 2003), para.286. 
11 See UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law 2005, A/RES/60/147, (UNBPG). 
12 Malcolm Sutton, Bear in mind these dead ... An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland 1969-
1993; and David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Chris Thornton, Brian Feeney, and David McVea, Lost 
Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children Who Died as a Result of the Northern Ireland 
Troubles, (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2004). 
13 See Anne Cadwallader, Lethal Allies: British Collusion in Ireland, Mercier Press, 2013; The Report 
of the Patrick Finucane Review by Sir Desmond de Silva QC, December 2012; and Brice Dickson, The 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Conflict in Northern Ireland, (OUP 2010), p167. 
14  Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, Victimology in transitional justice: Victimhood, 
innocence and hierarchy, European Journal of Criminology, 9(5) (2012) 527-538, p534. 
15 Mike Morrissey and Marie Smith, Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement: Victims, 
Grievance and Blame, Pluto Press (2002), p5; and Luc Huyse, Victims, in D. Bloomfiled, T. Barnes 
and L. Huyse (eds.), Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook, IDEA (2002), 54-65, p62. 
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Israeli/Palestinian conflict.16 The use of ‘innocent’ or ‘real’ identification of victims within 
conflicts and post-conflict societies perpetrates very powerful moral conceptions of 
victimhood.17 Given that collective violence is prolonged and multifaceted, simplistic black 
and white understandings of perpetrators and victims rarely neatly map onto the real world of 
conflicted and transitional societies.18 Instead the ‘messy’ reality of these conflicts can mean 
that there are complex identities of victimised-perpetrators, such as child soldiers.19 It is only 
through understanding this ‘thicker’ multi-perspective of victimisation for collective violence 
that we can begin to develop the law to effectively redress such harms.20  
Reparations represent both a symbolic acknowledgment of an individual’s 
victimhood and some form of remedial benefit. The remedial nature of reparations can come 
into immediate conflict with the definition of victims/perpetrators and the associated political 
discourses concerning who is seen as deserving. This can threaten to unsettle fragile and long-
term peace processes, such as in Peru and Northern Ireland, where provisions for victimised-
perpetrators to receive reparations have been met with protests and condemnation. As a result 
a ‘hierarchy of victims’ can arise, in which ‘innocent’ or ‘real’ victims are prioritised to 
facilitate the appropriation of blame and innocence in political narratives of past conflict.21 
Such moral gradation can feed competition for recognition amongst victims, influence 
decisions regarding material resources or symbolic gestures, such as monuments, and can 
potentially exclude less deserving individuals like victimised-perpetrators.22 As McEvoy and 
McConnachie argue, ‘the innocent’ victim is placed at the ‘apex of a hierarchy of victimhood 
and becomes a symbol around which contested notions of past violence and suffering are 
constructed and reproduced.’23 
Victims who are responsible for their own suffering or that of others has been a 
concern of victimology since its earlies iterations in positivist criminology, through  accounts 
which emphasised the victim’s actions, characteristics, or circumstances that precipitated or 
provoked the perpetrator to commit an offence.24 Predictably, such ‘victim blaming’ caused a 
                                                      
16 See David Bar-Tal, Lily Chernyak-Hai, Noas Schori, and Ayelet Gundar, A Sense of Self-Perceived 
Collective Victimhood in Intractable Conflicts, 91(874) International Review of the Red Cross, June 
2009, 229-258. 
17 Erica Bouris, Complex political victims, Kumarian (2007); and Morrissey and Smith, n.15. 
18 Collective violence is used here to cover gross violations of human rights, crimes against humanity 
and genocide. 
19 Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, Victims and Transitional Justice: Voice, Agency and 
Blame, Social and Legal Studies, 22(4) (2013) 489-513, p494. 
20 Kieran McEvoy, Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice, 
Journal of Law and Society 34(4) (2007) 411-440. 
21 See Bouris; and McEvoy and McConnachie n.14, p532.  
22 Huyse n.1, p64. 
23McEvoy and McConnachie n.14, p532. 
24 See Hans Von Hentig, The criminal and his victim: Studies in the socio-biology of crime, (Archon 
1967); and Martin F. Wolfgang, Victim precipitated criminal homicide, Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology, 48(1) (1957), 1-11. 
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significant backlash amongst critical and feminist criminologists. For example, Christie 
memorable description of the ‘ideal victim’ as ‘an innocent, vulnerable, good citizen, who has 
been attacked by a big, bad offender’ has had a long-standing resonance in domestic and 
international victimology.25 This construction of the ‘innocent victim’ serves to contrast the 
‘wicked’ perpetrator or terrorist who deserves punishment.26  More critical accounts of 
victimhood examine the ‘role of the law and the state in the victimisation process as well as 
the potential for human actors both to sustain and to change the conditions under which they 
act.’27 A critical understanding of victimhood exhibits the socio-political context whereby, in 
the real world, individuals are not always recognised as victims, owing to prevailing political 
or moral ‘labelling’ of who a victim should be and who deserves recognition.28 Through this 
perspective the concern for recognition and fair treatment of victims better reflects the 
relational or ‘lived reality’ of individuals and groups that suffer as a result of a crime, but it 
perhaps neglects the responsibility of some victims’ in their own harm and of others.29 
In relation to victimised-perpetrators McAlinden identifies there can be a ‘continuum 
of offending’ where victims are coerced or cooperate to facilitate perpetrator violence to 
avoid further suffering themselves and/or to survive.30 By making victims complicit or 
collaborators in the victimisation process, it can have the effect of further dehumanising them. 
A pertinent example is provided by those Jews who were used as ‘special squads’ in 
Auschwitz to burn the bodies of those who were killed in the gas chambers, before later 
suffering the same fate themselves. In the context of Northern Ireland most paramilitaries 
were volunteers and were not coerced, in comparison to those who are forced to commit 
atrocities, such as child soldiers or special squads. This ‘grey zone’ of identities counters the 
simplicity of perpetrators and victims as always being in two distinct blocs.31 Such binary 
construction of victimisation can gloss over issues of responsibility, such as with child 
soldiers, who are forced to commit atrocities, but may not fit into such a neat category of 
‘innocent’ where they become adults and rise to a position of command.32 
                                                      
25 See Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, British Journal of Criminology 17(1) (1977) 1-15, p19. 
26 David Becker, Elizabeth Lira, María Isabel Castillo, Elena Gómez, and Juana Kovalskys, Therapy 
with Victims of Political Repression in Chile: The Challenge of Social Reparation, Journal of Social 
Issues, 46 (3) (1990), 133-149, p135. 
27 Rob Mawby and Sandra Walklate, Critical Victimology: International Perspectives (Sage 1994), 
p177. 
28 Richard Quinney, Who is the Victim? Criminology 10 (1972) 314-323, p321. 
29  Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, Victimology in transitional justice: Victimhood, 
innocence and hierarchy, European Journal of Criminology, 9(5) (2012) 527-538, p530. 
30 Anne-Marie McAlinden, Deconstructing Victim and Offender Identities in Discourses on Child 
Sexual Abuse: Hierarchies, Blame and the Good/Evil Dialectic, British Journal of Criminology, p186. 
31 Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, (Abacus 1989), chapter 2. 
32 McEvoy and McConnachie, p533. See Erin K. Baines, Complex Political Perpetrators: Reflections 
on Dominic Ongwen, Journal of Modern African Studies 47(2) (2009) 163–191. 
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The focus of this article is on members of armed, paramilitary or terrorist groups, or 
state forces, who commit political violence, but have been victimised through identifiable 
gross violations of human rights law or international crimes, such as disappearances, 
extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, torture, serious injury, or ill-treatment caused by other 
actors. These crimes are distinguished due to their jus cogens nature as they are considered 
objectively illegal and can never be justified in their commission in international customary 
law, no matter the background or association of an individual.33 It notably excludes those who 
have self-inflicted injuries, breaking the causal link of unlawful harmed caused by others. 
Nonetheless, this article takes a critical victimological approach by recognising that such 
individuals are victims to avoid acknowledgement becoming a source of victimisation, but 
also appreciates their responsibility. As such, the law should not exclude those who have been 
seriously victimised, because of their association or past actions, but a more ‘thicker’ 
understanding to take into account their role in victimising others and determine what 
reparations are appropriate for such individuals. Accordingly, while those members of state or 
non-state armed groups who were seriously victimised should be eligible for reparations, it 
should also be acknowledged that they were responsible for victimising others and be made to 
contribute to reparations to their victims or have their forms of reparations limited. The final 
section of this article discusses the pros and cons of related models. Before advancing to this 
discussion, it is worth considering the relevant state practice and jurisprudence of regional 
human rights courts on these issues. 
Tackling victimised perpetrators in domestic reparation programmes 
Whether victimised-perpetrators should be eligible for reparations is not unique to Northern 
Ireland. In Latin America, countries like Colombia and Peru, which have suffered from 
protracted internal armed conflict, with violence committed by state and non-state armed 
groups. In both contexts victimised-perpetrators are ineligible for reparations. In Colombia 
the 2011 restitution of land law stipulates that members of illegal armed groups are not 
considered victims, except for those children or adolescents who have been demobilised when 
they were under 18.34 Interestingly family members of individuals in non-stated armed groups 
are recognised as victims where the person is killed, but not if they are injured. In the case of 
Peru the truth commission recognised the harm suffered by members of non-state armed 
groups, such as the Shining Path or Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Army (MRTA),35 but held 
                                                      
33 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, Law and 
Contemporary Problems 59 (1996) 63-74. 
34 Article 3(2), 2011 Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras en Colombia en Contexto. See Cristián 
Correa, From Principles to Practice: Challenges of Implementing Reparations for Massive Violations 
in Colombia, International Center for Transitional Justice, October 2015. 
35 Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. 
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that they were ‘victims, but not beneficiaries’ of reparations. 36  Similar the Peruvian 
reparations law explicitly excludes members of ‘subversive groups’ from reparations.37 
However, in both countries state forces are eligible for reparations, despite being implicated 
in atrocities.38 Similarly Iraq’s 2009 compensation law excluded only those individuals 
convicted of terrorism offences.39 In Spain members of terrorist groups are excluded from 
reparations.40 Yet in Basque and Navarre reparations laws do not explicitly exclude members 
of terrorist groups.41 
Other countries have included victimised-perpetrators in reparation programmes, 
including those members of non-state armed groups who were injured, such as in Sierra 
Leone or Timor Leste.42 In Kosovo the reparation law includes veterans, martyrs, members of 
the Kosovo Liberation Army, and civilians as eligible for reparations.43 This law is similar to 
that in Tunisia, reflecting the victory of one side in overthrowing the old regime, benefiting 
their own veterans or ‘martyrs’ as victims.44 In South Africa the promotion of reconciliation 
and the end of apartheid defined victims broadly to include those who suffered harm from 
gross violations of human rights or an act associated with a political objective for which an 
amnesty was granted. 45  As noted above, Borer and others have highlighted that this 
dichotomy did not capture the composite grey zone of identities, nor ‘perpetrators [who] are 
simultaneously victims’.46  Despite the broad definition of victimisation, numerous victims 
                                                      
36 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR) Report, vol. IX, pp. 149, 153. See Rebecca K. Root, 
Transitional Justice in Peru (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), p131. 
37 Article 4, Ley que crea el Plan Integral de Reparaciones (PIR), Ley Nº 28592 2006. 
38 See Luke Moffett, Reparations for ‘guilty victims’: Navigating Complex Identities of Victim-
Perpetrators in Reparation Mechanisms, International Journal of Transitional Justice (forthcoming 
2016). 
39 Article 17, 2009 Compensation for those affected by Military Operations, Military Mistakes and 
Terrorist Actions, Law No. 20.  
40 Article 4(3), Law 2/2003. 
41 In Basque country Decree 107/2012, of June 12, declaration and reparation for victims of unjust 
suffering as a result of the violation of their human rights, produced between 1960 and 1978 in the 
context of politically motivated violence lived in the Community Autonomous Basque (this has been 
successfully challenged by the Spanish government); and in Navarre, Regional Law 16/2015, of 10 
April, recognition and reparation for victims of acts of politically motivated caused by far-right groups 
or officials. 
42 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report, 2004 Vol.II, Chapter 4, paras.69-
70; Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR), Chega! (2006); Final 
Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya (2013), vol. IV. 
43 2011 Law no.03/L-054 on the Status and the Rights of the Martyrs, Invalids, Veterans, Members of 
Kosovo Liberation Army, Civilian Victims and their Families. 
44 See Tunisia’s 2011 Decree law No. 97 on reparation for the families of the “martyrs” and wounded 
persons of the revolution. 
45 TRC Report, Volume 1, p86. Section 1, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 
1995. 
46 Tshepo Madlingozi, Good victim, bad victim: Apartheid's beneficiaries, victims and the struggle for 
social justice, in W. Le Roux (ed.), Law, Memory and the Legacy of Apartheid: Ten years after 
AZAPO v President of South Africa, 107-126, p114, citing Don Foster, Paul Haupt, Marésa de Beer, 
The Theatre of Violence: Narratives of protagonists in the South African conflict, HSRC Press (2005), 
p4; and Borer. 
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were excluded from reparations, in particular those who were victimised by other violations 
not falling with the defined gross violations of human rights, harm suffered by acts committed 
by perpetrators not given an amnesty, or did not amount to a ‘political objective’.47 
Nevertheless a number of victimised perpetrators were recommended by the TRC for 
reparations. By way of example, in the case of the three AWB (Afrikaner Resistance 
Movement)48 members who were murdered by a police officer (who received an amnesty) in 
Mafikeng in March 1994, the family members of the deceased were recognised as victims and 
referred to the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee for consideration.49 The picture of 
victimisation is further clouded by the exclusion of innocent individuals who were wrongly 
convicted under the apartheid legal system, but who were deemed ineligible for amnesty or 
reparations.50 As such, there remains no consistent state practice on whether victimised-
perpetrators should be eligible for reparations. Instead eligibility is determined depending on 
the prevailing political context as to whether reparation can be inclusive as measures of 
reconciliation, or exclusive and measures of justice. 
Regional human rights courts and victimised-perpetrators 
Regional human rights courts are not immune from the challenge of adjudicating on 
victimised-perpetrators who claim reparations. While the principle of non-discrimination is 
espoused in human rights treaties and the UN Basic Principles on the Right to Remedy and 
Reparations, the issue of victimised perpetrators has proved more divisive in the 
jurisprudence of regional human rights courts.51 The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) case of McCann v United Kingdom, which concerned the shooting dead of three 
members of the IRA by British special forces in Gibraltar as they were planning to bomb a 
military parade, provides an interesting example. Although the court ruled that their deaths 
were a result of unlawful use of force and a violation of article 2 on the right to life, 
compensation for families of those killed was deemed inappropriate as, ‘the three terrorist 
suspects who were killed had been intending to plant a bomb in Gibraltar’.52  
Pellonpää suggests that a better interpretation of the Court’s decision in McCann is based 
on legal principles, such as contributory fault (or assumption of risk) that the victims’ own 
                                                      
47 Mahmood Mamdani, Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC), Diacritics 32(3–4) (2002) 33–59. 
48 Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging, a far right paramilitary Afrikaner group. 
49 Application in Terms of Section 18 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 
No.34 of 1995. Ontlametse Bernstein Menyatsoe Applicant (AM 7498/97), 5 August 1999, involving 
the deaths of Jacobus Stephanus Uys, Alwyn Wolfaardt and Nicolaas Cornelius Fourie. Borer also 
gives the example of Winnie Mandela, p1098-99. 
50 Mallinder p97-98. 
51 Article 14, European Convention of Human Rights; Article 2(3), International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; Article 25, American Convention on Human Rights; and principle 25, 2005 UN Basic 
Principles on Right to Remedy and Reparations. 
52 McCann v UK, para.219. 
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acts contributed to their loss.53 This could be the application of the equitable doctrine of 
‘clean hands’, which has at times been used by the European Court in other cases as a 
mitigating factor in determining compensation, due to the victim’s responsibility or 
contribution in aggravating their own harm.54 Yet, given the serious nature of violations such 
as the right to life, the application of contributory fault or the clean hands doctrine is a 
misapplication of private law principles and undermines the equal protection of individuals 
under the law. 
Since the McCann case the ECtHR has limited its examination to the state’s compliance 
with procedural obligations, i.e. to effectively investigate such allegations of gross violations, 
paying less attention to the factual circumstances of the substantive violation of the right to 
life. This is apparent in the Kelly and other v UK case where, in facts similar to McCann, 
eight members of the IRA (and one civilian bystander) were shot by the SAS while driving a 
bomb into a police station in Loughgall.55 In the Kelly case the Court did not examine the 
substantive violation of life, citing ongoing domestic proceedings and instead found a 
violation of the procedural obligation to carry out an effective investigation. On this basis the 
Court awarded compensation to the victims’ families due to them suffering ‘feelings of 
frustration, distress and anxiety’. Notably in contrast to the McCann decision, the Court did 
not engage in determination of the moral worth of those who died, by distinguishing terrorists 
from the civilian bystander.56 This is consistent with the European Court’s proclivity in cases 
of grave and multiple violations of rights to award compensation, due to the serious harm 
caused to the victims, reflecting private law notions of remedying suffering, rather than moral 
distinctions.57 This can be seen by a more recent statement by the Grand Chamber of the 
Court on the purpose of compensation awards that, 
it [is not] the Court’s role to function akin to a domestic tort mechanism court in 
apportioning fault and compensatory damages between civil parties. Its guiding principle 
is equity, which above all involves flexibility and an objective consideration of what is 
just, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, including not only the 
position of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred.58 
However, in subsequent cases involve detention of terrorist members, such as in Del Río 
Prada v Spain, the court awarded compensation to a convicted member of the terrorist group 
                                                      
53 Matti Pellonpää, Individual reparation claims under the European Convention on Human Rights, in 
A; Randelshofer and C. Tomuchat (eds.), State responsibility and the individual: Reparation in 
instances of grave violations of human rights, Martin Nijhoff (1999), 109-124, p112. 
54  Rombouts et al. n.42, p386. For instance in the Beyler v Italy, Application no. 33202/96, 28 May 
2002. 
55 Kelly and Others v United Kingdom, Application no. 30054/96, 4 May 2001. 
56 Kelly, para.162. 
57 See Erdoğan and Others v Turkey, Application no. 19807/92, 25 April 2006, para.109; and Yandiyev 
and Others v Russia, Applications nos. 34541/06, 43811/06 and 1578/07, 10 October 2013. 
58 Varnava and others v Turkey, Applications nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 
16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, 18 September 2009, para.224; and Al-Skeini and Others 
v the United Kingdom, Application no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, para.182. 
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ETA for unlawful detention.59 A distinction could be perhaps drawn between this case and 
McCann, with the latter involving members of a terrorist organisation in an active operation 
to carry out a bombing, whereas Del Rio Prada was in the custody of the state.  
In contrast the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which has been dealing with 
decades of state violence, has until very recently generally recognised members of non-state 
armed groups as victims as eligible for reparations. In one of the notable cases of Miguel 
Castro Castro v Peru, state forces stormed a high security prison, which contained a number 
of members of the rebel group, the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), resulting in the deaths 
of 41 female inmates and the injury of 175 others. Added to this, the state subsequently failed 
to properly investigate claims of extrajudicial executions and ill-treatment. Although the state 
admitted its partial responsibility for those killed and injured, it was reluctant to acknowledge 
them as victims who could claim reparations. The Peruvian government instead directed the 
Court to place such violations in the ‘context’ of an ‘extremely serious situation of internal 
conflict’, with reparations to be determined in line with domestic policies.60 The Inter-
American Court rejected the state’s claims, awarding substantial compensation to victims and 
their next of kin, as well as ordering the state to effectively investigate the violations, provide 
medical and psychological assistance, publicly acknowledge the state’s responsibility through 
a public ceremony broadcasted by the media, include the names of those killed in the prison 
on the ‘Eye that Cries’ memorial, and educate state forces on human rights norms to prevent 
future violations.61  
In subsequent proceedings, the Peruvian government sought clarification of this decision 
on the grounds that victims as members of the Shining Path were responsible for committing 
serious violations of human rights of other Peruvians, and the Court needed to respect the 
memory of those they had victimised. Moreover, the Peruvian government argued that by 
providing substantial compensation to members of the Shining Path as victims, the Court’s 
award of compensation could allow them to continue their ‘subversive’ campaign through 
new violent acts. Instead, the Peruvian government sought the Court’s approval to off-set the 
victims’ compensation as part of their debt to those they had victimised as identified in their 
criminal convictions.62 This stance of the Peruvian government reflected both the need to 
acknowledge such violations and ‘innocent’ victims’ suffering, as well as to provide a more 
                                                      
59 Cf. Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Villiger, Steiner, Power-Forde, Lemmens and Griţco in 
Del Río Prada v Spain, Application no. 42750/09, 21 October 2013.  
60 Miguel Castro Castro Prison v Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment 25 November 2006, 
Series C No.160, paras.135 and 142. 
61 $60,000 for those 41 individuals killed, and $22,000-$45,000 for those survivors who were injured. 
Castro Castro Prison ibid., paras.410-469. 
62 Miguel Castro Castro Prison v Peru, Interpretation of the Judgment on Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment 2 August 2008, Series C No.181, paras.29-30. 
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contextual understanding that those before the Court were members of an armed group who 
were responsible for committing numerous atrocities.63 
In response the Inter-American Court refused to mitigate or bar such compensation to the 
victims, on the grounds that as a human rights court it lacked the power to determine the 
nature and aggravating circumstances of the criminal acts of the victims, distinguishing it 
from a criminal court and determinations of individual criminal responsibility.64 Instead the 
jurisdiction of the Court was to examine the international responsibility of the Peruvian state 
in fulfilling its obligations under the American Convention, which could not be mitigated by 
the actions of the victims, owing to the serious nature of the violations. By acknowledging 
members of Shining Path as victims and deserving of reparations, the Court refuted the 
Peruvian government’s suggestions that these victims as terrorists were outside the protection 
of the law, as well as affirming the serious wrongdoing by the state against these individuals. 
Since 2014 the Inter-American Court has taken a more conservative view, limiting or 
excluding victimised members of non-state armed groups from certain forms of reparations. 
In the Palace of Justice v Colombia case, the Colombian government disappeared a number 
of suspects after the terrorist group M-19 attacked the highest court in Bogotá to destroy 
evidence against narco-traffickers.65 At least 94 people were killed, including 11 Supreme 
Court judges, with 11 further suspected members of M-19, mostly cafeteria workers, 
disappeared by the Colombian army, including Irma Franco Pineda a law student and member 
of M-19. The Colombian government argued that Irma should be ineligible for reparations 
and would be barred from any compensation in domestic law.66 However, the Court ruled that 
the family of Irma should receive $5,000 for pecuniary damage, but no compensation for the 
moral harm caused. In comparison other victims not affiliated with M-19 received $35,000-
$48,000 pecuniary compensation and $70,000-$100,000 for moral harm.67 
Similarly in the case of Cruz Sanchez et al. v Peru, another hostage crisis by the terrorist 
group MRTA ended with a raid by Peruvian special forces where 14 died, including 11 of the 
MRTA hostage takers.68 The Inter-American Court found that the Peruvian commandos had 
extra-judicially executed at least three members of MRTA who had surrendered, including 
Eduardo Cruz Sanchez. The family of those killed did not ask for pecuniary damages, but did 
seek moral damages. The Court held that it was inappropriate to order compensation in this 
                                                      
63 See Rebecca K. Root, Transitional Justice in Peru, Palgrave MacMillan (2012).  
64 Castro Castro Prison, para.40. 
65 Case of Rodríguez Vera et al. (The Disappeared from the Palace of Justice) v Colombia, Judgment 
Of November 14, 2014 (Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs). 
66 Judgment of the Council of State of September 11, 1997, in the proceedings instituted by the next of 
kin of Irma Franco Pineda. Rodríguez Vera et al v Colombia, para.587 and 594. 
67 Rodríguez Vera et al v Colombia, para.591-604. 
68 Cruz Sánchez et al. (Japanese embassy siege) v Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs. Judgment of April 17, 2015. Series C No. 292. 
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case, and rehabilitation and publication of the judgment against Peru would be sufficient.69 
Judge Pérez partially dissenting believed that the family of Eduardo should have been eligible 
for compensation, given the serious harm caused to the family.70 Judge Mac-Gregor Poisot, 
concurring with the judgment, held that the exclusion of the family members of MRTA from 
compensation could be discriminatory, but did not go as far to say that monetary awards 
should be made for Eduardo.71 These decisions can be read in light of the political context of 
the Inter-American Court finds itself, were decisions like Miguel Castro Castro prison cased 
uproar and protest in Peru, with the Peruvian government threatening to leave the court’s 
jurisdiction. Moreover, unlike earlier cases, the Inter-American Court failed to provide any 
reasons for these distinctions. 
It is apparent that the issue of reparation for victimised members of terrorist groups 
remains highly controversial even with international human rights courts, which are premised 
on redress for violations and non-discrimination. In most cases, victimised-perpetrators are 
excluded or have their reparations limited, due to the unlawful nature of their organisations 
and actions. This article argues that members of paramilitary or terrorist groups who have 
been unlawfully killed or seriously injured should be eligible for some form of reparations. 
Part of the rationale for this case is that, by excluding such individuals from reparations we 
may create three inter-related problems: (1) contribute to narratives that victim-perpetrators 
deserved such suffering or such violence was justified and deny redress for serious violations; 
(2) prevent the application of reparations to vulnerable or marginalised groups, who resort to 
violence against the more powerful state, weakening the purpose of reparations to effectively 
remedy harm; and (3) undermine long term prospects of peace by leaving certain categories 
of suffering unaccounted for and unresolved, risking the recurrence of such violence in the 
future.72 It is worth now turning to discuss the Northern Ireland experience in tackling this 
issue and current proposals with the pension bill for seriously injured victims. 
The Northern Ireland experience with reparations 
Different forms of reparations have been used to address some of the harm caused by the 
Troubles in and around Northern Ireland.73 However as mentioned at the beginning of this 
article, these measures have been somewhat inconspicuous given their piecemeal or 
inadequate effect in remedying victims’ harm. Successes have included recovery of the 
                                                      
69 Cruz Sánchez et al. para.483-485. 
70 Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Alberto Pérez Pérez, para.4 
71 Concurring opinion, para.23. 
72 Bouris, p75. Report on Reparations by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff, A/69/518, 8 October 2014, para.20. 
73 See Patricia MacBride, Reparations in Northern Ireland - A duty to victims? Commission for 
Victims and Survivors, 2011 
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remains of those individuals disappeared by Republican groups.74 Yet most victims have had 
to rely on claiming compensation through the courts or compensation agencies, or are 
dependent on services, which have inadequately redressed their suffering. It is useful to first 
briefly outline some of these financial provisions to victims, before discussing in more depth 
the proposed pension for seriously injured victims. 
Past and current financial support to victims 
Some victims have been able to obtain compensation through the courts and the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Scheme, which as an administration programme provided monetary 
awards to victims based on common law equity principles determined by the courts.75 
However, this scheme did not acknowledge victims’ pain or loss or bereavement and court 
orders were only accessible to those who could afford a lawyer.76 Only in 1988 was a 
bereavement payment available to spouses and parents of those killed.77 It was replaced in 
2002 by a tariff scheme, where the Compensation Agency would determine the amount of 
compensation on a statutory basis, removing the discretion of the court, and allowing appeals 
of compensation awards by an independent panel.78 In addition, the 2002 tariff scheme also 
included that compensation was to be calculated ‘to acknowledge the grief and sorrow caused 
by the death of that person and the loss of that person's care, guidance and society’.79 
Bloomfield reports that from 1969 until 31st March 1998 the Compensation Agency had paid 
out some £186 million to victims of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland, with £26 million 
paid to relatives of those killed, and £160 million to those injured.80 Although this is a 
substantial amount of money, if there were over 3,600 people killed and over 40,000 injured 
these amounts would be inadequate in the long term averaging a few thousand to each victim. 
Compensation amounts awarded under these schemes or awarded by the court were often 
seen as insufficient as they were based on income rather than need, i.e. relatives of those 
killed in the 1970s were only awarded a few hundred pounds.81 
The compensation schemes have been more substantively criticised. Relatives of 
those paramilitaries killed during the conflict have been denied compensation, due to their 
membership of an unlawful organisation or engagement in terrorist activities at any time in 
                                                      
74 See Kieran McEvoy and Heather Conway, The Dead, the Law, and the Politics of the Past, Journal 
of Law and Society 31(4), 2004, 539-62. 
75 See Criminal Injuries (Compensation) (Northern Ireland) Order 1977. 
76 MacBride p4. 
77 S.9, Criminal injuries (Compensation) (Northern Ireland) Order 1988. 
78 Criminal Injuries Compensation (Northern Ireland) Order 2002. 
79 S.4(2)(d), Criminal Injuries Compensation (Northern Ireland) Order 2002. 
80 Bloomfield (1998), para 5.6. 
81 Consultative Group on the Past Final Report (2009) p91; and WAVE report p10. 
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the past or present.82 This exclusion also denied compensation to the relatives of those 
paramilitaries who had served their sentences and were subsequently killed on release.83 This 
is further complicated by numerous other individuals who were never convicted, being able to 
claim compensation. Victims who were injured also faced their compensation being cut after 
16 years, despite their deteriorating health and increasing dependency as they become older.84 
In addition, victims’ life expectancy was underestimated, and as they were unable to work as 
result of their injuries the compensation awarded prevented their subsequent state benefit 
allowances.85 On a more theoretical level, compensation schemes are not purely reparations 
as they equate violence during the conflict with ordinary crime, rather than awarding further 
damages for the sectarian motivation behind the crime. Furthermore, compensation schemes 
are based on ‘social solidarity’ that acknowledge that the harm victims’ suffered was morally 
wrong, but without any judgement on responsibility (whether provided independently or by 
those responsible).86 
The Bloomfield report on victims of the conflict identified a number of problems 
with the compensation available and recommended that funding be secured for for victims 
and survivors The Northern Ireland Memorial Fund (NIMF) was subsequently established in 
2001. The NIMF provided financial assistance to victims and survivors who lost a spouse or 
partner, were seriously injured or a primary carer, through eight grants covering short breaks, 
chronic pain management, disability allowance, education and training, and other 
allowances.87 The NIMF was originally established as a benevolent fund, but in 2010 it 
changed to a conditional means-tested scheme due to financial constraints. In 2012/2013 the 
budget of the NIMF was £ 3,304,250 for 2,869 potential applicants.88 From 2001-2012 some 
11,000 victims and survivors availed of the fund and were awarded some £17 million.89 
Considering the number of victims of the conflict, the fund only helped a fraction of those 
affected. Yet, the NIMF was an important source of funding for those who did avail of it, 
considering their financial and social hardship. In April 2012, as part of the Stormont 
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executive’s ten year Strategy on Victims and Survivors, the NIMF90 was subsumed within the 
newly created Victims and Survivors Service (VSS) with an allocated £36 million annual 
budget, which is intended to coordinate and fund the provision of services to victims, 
including counselling, befriending, respite breaks, chronic pain management and retraining 
schemes. The VSS since its establishment in 2013 has been criticised for its intrusive 
individual needs assessment and delays in funding to groups.91 
Currently a service-based approach dominates provision to victims and survivors’ 
needs. As a result of the Good Friday Agreement and subsequent reports into assistance for 
victims, funds were established to support victims through numerous groups, representing 
different areas, constituents and political opinion.92 Beneficiaries of such schemes are based 
on the broad definition of the Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006 of victim 
as,  
someone who is or has been physically or psychologically injured, [provides 
substantial amount of care for such a person, or bereaved] as a result of or in 
consequence of a conflict-related incident.93 
 
The inclusive nature of the definition was intentional to avoid contention over eligibility for 
service provision, reflecting more humanitarian concerns over addressing harm than 
accountability.94 As such, victimised-perpetrators can and do access services through the VSS 
and the Commission for Victims and Survivors can advocate on their behalf as victims. 
However, the future of such support to victims is dependent on budgetary allocations by the 
Office of the First and Deputy First Minister, making such provision discretionary without 
any long-term commitment.95 In terms of accountability, such measures do not publicly 
acknowledge individuals as victims, as service provision loses the recognition, entitlement 
and responsibility aspects associated with reparations through their delivery by groups. In 
terms of remedy, services provided have been criticised for their access issues, location, 
standard of provision, and ability to respond to victims’ needs.96 
In 2009 the Consultative Group on the Past (CGP), came closer to providing more 
inclusive reparations that acknowledged victims’ harm and provided something close to an 
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appropriate amount of compensation to those families bereaved.97 Basing their conclusions on 
the operation of a similarly inclusive scheme in the Republic of Ireland, the CGP recognised 
the shortcomings of compensation for the harm caused by the conflict, recommended that a 
‘one-off ex-gratia recognition payment’ of £12,000 be paid to the relatives of those killed 
during the conflict, to acknowledge the loss they have endured.98 The language of ‘ex-gratia’ 
is important, as it implies that such a payment is charitable, rather than based on any legal 
obligation, identifiable responsible actor or entitlement for such victims to a remedy. 
Nonetheless, this one recommendation proved politically controversial, as family members of 
terrorists who were killed would receive money, arguably equating their suffering with those 
of ‘innocent’ civilian victims. Moreover, an overlooked issue was that this payment excluded 
those who had been seriously injured. As a result of the recognition payment 
recommendation, the whole report was rejected, despite its comprehensive proposals on 
addressing truth and justice. Discussions on the past since 2009 have been muted on 
reparations, with only the issue of the pension for seriously injured victims gaining traction 
since 2014. 
A pension for seriously injured victims 
The most recent proposal on providing some form of reparations has come in the form a 
pension for seriously injured victims. It is based on the research of Breen-Smyth that 
identified the needs of those seriously injured and their lack of a pension, as they were unable 
to work.99 As a result, WAVE and its associated injured victims group have advocated for a 
pension,100 which has been endorsed by the Commission for Victims and Survivors.101 The 
proposed pension for those seriously injured serves to acknowledge the harm endured and 
alleviate their daily suffering, by providing them financial security in the old age. The number 
of those eligible are likely to be less than 500 with most averaging a 50% rate of pension 
based on the level of their disablement, based on data collected by WAVE from NI Memorial 
Fund and payments made through the VSS.  
Other countries have adopted similar pensions, such as Spain which has a 
comparative generous scheme for those victimised by terrorism – a monthly payment of 
approximately €1,600 per month, but excludes members of terrorist organisations. 102 
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Similarly in Chile monthly pensions, access to specialist healthcare and educational 
scholarships have been provided to survivors of torture and political imprisonment.103 WAVE 
recommends that the pension should be based on the following principles: non-contributory; 
non-means tested; completely disregarded for the purposes of calculating entitlement to 
means tested benefit; the level of payments should be graded to reflect the differing levels of 
disablement that those injured in the Troubles experience; and continue beyond state 
retirement age.104 These measures are meant to ensure the pension is easy to administer, as 
there is no need to develop rules around contribution conditions or to assess the applicant’s 
wealth.105  
To reflect reparation principles in human rights law and the recent report by the UN 
Special Rapporteur (UNSR) on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of 
non-recurrence, Mr Pablo de Greiff, noted that the pension should also have a dedicated 
budget line.106 A pension by itself is not enough and UNSR Greiff stipulates that such 
measures need to be accompanied by other measures, such as rehabilitation, measures of 
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and 
the UN Basic Principles on the Right to Remedy and Reparations support this, on the grounds 
that compensation by itself cannot redress the public and moral harm suffered by victims.107 
The comprehensiveness of any proposed pension will inevitably confront the challenge of 
determining the eligibility of victims. The experience of the Consultative Group on the Past’s 
recognition payment, suggests that any sort of payment based on harm suffered during the 
Troubles is likely to be polemic. Even before the draft legislation has been introduced to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly headlines in the local newspapers have read ‘Disabled ex-
terrorists may get £150-a-week pension’108 (with a picture of a man in a balaclava with a rifle) 
and ‘Pensions for IRA - but not for IRA's victims’.109 The following section proposes a 
number of avenues to navigate the difficulties of eligibility and defining who is a victim for 
the purposes of the proposed pension. 
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Finding a way forward on victim eligibility in Northern Ireland 
This section identifies three avenues are identified: a non-discriminatory approach; a review 
panel; and a private trust fund. It also suggests ways to defining who is eligible with some 
clarity and some remaining challenges for such a pension scheme.110 
1. A non-discriminatory approach  
The current service provision to victims and survivors makes no distinction between civilian, 
security forces or paramilitaries who seek to access services and secure individual assistance 
payments. This non-discriminatory approach is consistent with human rights law that 
everyone should have access to effective remedy for serious injury or death. As discussed 
above, even regional human rights courts do not have consistent jurisprudence on the 
eligibility of claimants for reparations who are members of non-state armed or terrorist 
groups. The Victims and Survivors (NI) Order 2006 definition of victims and survivors is a 
quite broad inclusive definition. However, this definition is inapplicable for constructing a 
pension programme for seriously injured victims in Northern Ireland as it is specifically 
stipulated to be construed in terms of the work of the Commission for Victims and Survivors 
in advocating on victims’ interests. In more practical terms in order for reparations to be 
feasible and include a meaningful amount, it is necessary to consider those who suffer the 
most and continue to feel the harmful effects, such as injured victims. Such a wide definition 
under the 2006 Order would make a large victim population eligible, diluting the amount and 
proportion available for those who suffer the most. That said if the Victims and Survivors 
(NI) Order 2006 was adopted for seriously injured victims based on those who suffer 
disablement it would provide a non-discriminatory approach. 
Similarly in private law, which provides the basis for reparations in international law, 
there are a number of principles for dealing with claims on the part of those who have both 
been responsible for inflicting harm and victims of harm. In equity the ‘clean hands’ doctrine, 
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volenti non fit injuria, prevents an individual from deriving a profit from their own wrong.111 
The rationale for this doctrine is to ensure that ‘no polluted hand shall touch the pure 
foundations of justice’ by excluding those from claiming redress where they have committed 
wrongs in the public interest.112 As such, responsibility for the harm is supposed to be 
balanced between the parties in determining liability and causation of the injury.113  
Perhaps more applicable is torts law, in particular trespasses against the person (such 
as battery), with the two principles of illegality and contributory negligence, which place 
limits on individuals’ ability to claim damages where they are responsible for their own or 
others’ suffering. With the first of these, illegality is based on the defensive principle of ex 
turpi causa non oritur actio that no action can arise for an individual who engages in an 
immoral or illegal act. This rule is again based on public policy to prevent a person from 
profiting from their wrongdoing.114 Nonetheless, the defence of illegality has been held 
inapplicable to claims of trespass against the person.115 This exception is on the grounds that 
individuals should not be excluded from the protection of the law, as to do otherwise would 
undermine the integrity of the legal system and access to redress for serious harm.116 
However, the courts will take into account the claimant’s illegal conduct in their own 
suffering that is so ‘inextricably linked’ with his own ‘criminal or illegal conduct that the 
court could not permit him to recover without appearing to condone that conduct’; in other 
words an individual cannot claim redress if they have suffered from their own hand, reflecting 
a distinction between internal and external causation of harm.117 That said the courts do take a 
more pragmatic approach based on the facts of the case and public policy, moving away from 
moral responsibility in terms of the historical immorality or ‘public consciousness test’.118  
In light of the pragmatic approach to illegality in this context, the courts ability to 
determine responsibility or fault of a claimant turns more on their contributory negligence. 
This rule distinguishes between a claimant’s right to claim a remedy, if they suffer damage 
both as a result of their own fault and the fault of another person, but it does not debar them 
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from claiming damages.  However, it does allow a defendant a defence to reduce the damages 
available on ‘just and equitable’ terms on the basis of the claimant’s share of their 
responsibility in the damage.119 At least in the UK, contributory negligence is not applicable 
to trespasses against the person, on the basis that such harm is criminalised on public policy 
grounds, as according to Glanville Williams, it is a ‘penal provision aimed at repressing 
conduct fragrantly wrongful...’ as well as it is the ‘…result of the ordinary human feeling that 
the defendant’s wrongful intention so outweighs the [claimant’s] wrongful negligence as to 
efface it altogether.’120 Accordingly, when it comes to trespasses against the person, the courts 
are very reluctant to prevent individuals from being able to seek damages as a remedy for 
serious harm in the form of personal injury, regardless of their background or past conduct. 
This is apparent in the case of Aidan McKeever, a getaway driver in an IRA attack on the 
police station in Coalisland in 1992. He was successful in suing the Ministry of Defence for 
injuries suffered in the course of an ambush by the SAS, which killed four other IRA 
members. The High Court found that the SAS were not justified in shooting him and upheld 
the award of £75,000.121 The Ministry of Defence raised the defences of volenti non fit 
injuria, ex turpi causa non oritur actio and contributory negligence, but these were all 
rejected by the court. This decision may not vindicate a non-discriminatory approach, but 
rather the failure of the Ministry of Defence satisfying the evidential burden in proving the 
defences. As such private law, human rights courts (to some extent) and the Victims and 
Survivors (NI) Order 2006 all recognise a non-discriminatory approach for defining victims 
and with the former two, for compensation. 
2. A review panel  
An alternative approach to ensure the expediency of claims of civilians who were seriously 
injured, would involve provision for a review panel. This could be built into the pension 
legislation to determine whether victimised-perpetrators should be eligible based on their 
circumstances. Such a review panel is provided for under the Civil Service (Special Advisers) 
Act (Northern Ireland) 2013, which was a private members bill brought forward to exclude 
convicted members of paramilitary groups from being employed as special advisors to 
Northern Ireland government ministers. The 2013 Act review panel can determine whether 
those convicted of a ‘serious criminal conviction’122 can be eligible for a special adviser 
position taking into account: 
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(a)whether the person has shown contrition for the offence to which the serious 
criminal conviction relates,  
(b)whether the person has taken all reasonable steps to assist in the investigation and 
prosecution of all other persons connected with the commission of the offence,  
(c)the views of any victim of the offence, or where a victim has died, the views of 
any close family member of the victim.123 
 
For the purposes of the pension bill the panel could take into account the time victimised-
perpetrators served in prison, gravity of their offence(s), their disability, and the impact of 
their serious injury in daily life. There should also be provision for appeal to a high court 
judge if an individual is unhappy with the outcome of the review panel.124 Alternatively an 
appeals process could be built into legislation to avoid costly litigation and to provide prompt 
hearings, before a single sitting judge. 
Alternatively a review panel could assess the extent of the person’s harm against their 
responsibility. Individuals who were victimised members of non-state armed groups, could be 
included into the pension scheme, but their amount could be reduced by a proportionate 
amount to reflect their past responsibility in victimising others. In some domestic criminal 
injury compensation schemes individuals can be barred or limited to claiming certain amounts 
of compensation, as can their family members, based on the direct victim’s background, 
association or past conduct.125 Given their moral basis, criminal injury compensation schemes 
generally award compensation to ‘good citizens’, i.e. ‘ideal’ victims.126 By way of example, 
in Northern Ireland the amount of compensation can be reduced or withheld, based on: the 
individual’s conduct before, during or after the incident; the individual’s failure to inform or 
cooperate with the police; their ‘character’ based on his/her criminal convictions; or the 
minister’s discretion that such an award would be inappropriate.127 The basis of excluding or 
limiting compensation to victimised-perpetrators is to reflect the belief that such persons who 
have committed offences in the past have, 
probably caused distress and loss and injury to other persons, and has certainly 
caused considerable expense to society by reason of court appearances and the cost of 
supervising sentences, even when they have been non-custodial, and the victims may 
themselves have sought compensation, which is another charge on society. Even 
though a victim may be blameless in the incident in which the injury was 
sustained…128  
Accordingly, victimised-perpetrators are not automatically excluded from claiming 
compensation. However, their amount of compensation can be reduced through a series of 
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penalty points depending on the length of their conviction and the time since their release; as 
well as the gravity of the claim in relation to the claimant’s criminal background.129 Thus 
mitigating a victimised-perpetrator’s claim for compensation, or more broadly reparations, 
could reflect their responsibility, both internally in the harm they caused themselves and 
externally to harm caused to others. The scaled system of reducing their compensation could 
evince retribution through ensuring that their responsibility is proportionally reflected in their 
final award. Yet allowing them access to reparation acknowledges their suffering and that 
they deserve some form of remedy, meaning that their past actions should not bar them from 
protection of the law. In Northern Ireland at least, this compensation was restructured in part 
for this purpose, due to previous schemes denying compensation to the families of those 
paramilitaries unlawfully killed by private or state actors.130 This approach reflects that such 
individuals are both responsible in victimising others, but due to their seriousness of their 
suffering they should have some form of remedy. 
3. Private trust fund  
To avoid the pension bill handing a ‘terrorist’ a monthly government cheque, a private trust 
fund could be established as part of the pension bill for those seriously injured individuals 
who were members of paramilitary groups. Those ‘innocent’ victims who suffered serious 
injuries would automatically receive their pension from the government. However, those 
victimised-perpetrators would receive a comparable amount through the private trust fund, 
allowing them access to a pension as a victim, without attaching government money to it. 
Such funds could come from private charitable donors, international organisations, or even 
prisoner groups to ensure that they ‘look after their own’.  
In South Africa a separate pension fund was set up for members of former state and 
non-state armed groups, such as the ANC military wing MK, on the basis of the sacrifices 
such forces made in the establishment of democracy.131 The pension board in determining 
awards could take into account the individual’s role and motive in a political offence, and its 
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nature and gravity on state and non-state actors.132 The International Criminal Court has a 
Trust Fund for Victim (TFV), which has two mandates: to provide assistance to victims; and 
to act as a financial repository and provider of reparations where perpetrators are indigent.133 
Although the TFV is not set up to avoid difficult issues of victimised-perpetrators, it is 
providing reparations to child soldiers in the Lubanga case, as the convicted person is 
indigent.  In the Northern Ireland context, it may be difficult for such groups to fund raise 
such money and may not be palatable to victimised-perpetrators as it concedes that there is a 
hierarchy of victims. Thus the first two models seem more viable. Beyond these avenues to 
craft an equitable solution for victimised-perpetrators and ‘innocent victims’, defining who is 
eligible will be key. 
Defining who is eligible 
The definition of which victims are eligible for the pension has to be carefully crafted so as to 
be clear and to achieve a reasonably equitable solution for all affected victims. There are four 
possible grounds for defining eligibility: inclusive; unlawful harm; serious criminal 
convictions/scheduled offences; and qualified. With the first of these, WAVE and the 
Commission for Victims and Survivors have suggest an inclusive approach in their guidance 
on the pension as: 
a) The claimant suffered physical injury(s) as a result of Troubles related incident(s); 
b) the injury(s) has resulted in disablement.134 
This inclusive approach reflects that anyone who suffered serious violations should have 
access to a remedy, compliant with the non-discrimination principle in human rights law, no 
matter their background. It also reflects the broad definition under the Victims and Survivors 
Order 2006. Moreover, this inclusive definition does not tackle the issue of ex-combatants 
who were responsible for victimising others, but ended up themselves suffering serious 
injuries. There are perhaps other ways of crafting a legal definition to address these 
individuals. 
The second option of unlawful suffering is to define eligibility as: 
a) The claimant suffered physical injury(s) as a result of Troubles related incident(s), 
which was unlawfully caused by another person or organisation; 
b) the injury(s) has resulted in disablement. 
This would allow a broad category of individuals to be eligible for the pension, but would 
implicitly exclude those who injured themselves (such as bomb-makers) or were lawfully shot 
by the security forces. This is compliant with the judgment in the aforementioned Aidan 
McKeever v Ministry of Defence, where the claimant (an unarmed getaway driver for the 
IRA) was unlawfully shot and injured (four other IRA members were killed) by the British 
                                                      
132 Section 1(2), Special Pensions Act 1996. 
133 Article 79. See Luke Moffett, Reparative Complementarity: Ensuring an Effective Remedy for 
Victims in the Reparation Regime of the International Criminal Court, International Journal of Human 
Rights 17(3) (2013) 368-390. 
134 Stuart Magee, Exploring models for the proposal of special pension provision for those injured in 
the Northern Ireland “Troubles”, WAVE Trauma, p3; A Pension for people severely injured in the 
Troubles Commission Advice Paper, CVSNI, 11th September 2013, p6. 
 25 
army in February 1992.135 Accordingly this approach reflects a basic tenet of the rule of law 
and human rights law that everyone who suffers unlawful intentional harm should have 
access to a remedy. 
The third option is an explicit exclusion of convicted ex-combatants as: 
a) The claimant suffered physical injury(s) as a result of Troubles related incident(s); 
b) the injury(s) has resulted in disablement; 
c) this excludes any person who has been convicted for a serious criminal conviction 
or scheduled offence. 
The definition of serious criminal conviction would follow that used in the Civil Service 
(Special Advisers) Act (Northern Ireland) 2013 of a crime that resulted in a convicted with an 
imprisonment of five years or more, which would include most scheduled offences, such as 
membership of a proscribed organisation. This is consistent with the Rehabilitation of 
Offenders (NI) Order 1978, where those convicted of offences of imprisonments ordered over 
five years or life cannot have their sentence rehabilitated or their conviction spent.136 
However the difficulty with this exclusion is that not every ex-combatant was convicted and it 
thus would not exclude every single victimised-perpetrator. Moreover, the Criminal Case 
Review Commission, which examines wrongful convictions, has over 300 appeals most of 
which are overturning convictions based on improperly obtained confessions. The Iraqi 
compensation law for those injured during military operations or terrorist offences excludes 
anyone convicted under the their terrorism act, ‘until proven innocent’, which is perhaps a 
workaround for this issue.137 
The fourth option is a qualified definition of: 
a) The claimant suffered physical injury(s) as a result of Troubles related incident(s); 
b) the injury(s) has resulted in disablement; 
c) any person convicted for a serious criminal conviction or scheduled offence their 
eligibility will be dealt with through the review panel/their amount will be determined 
through the tariff system. 
This would allow ex-combatants to be distinguished from civilians, as responsible actors that 
were involved in causing suffering to others, but given the seriousness of their individual 
harm caused by others deserve some form of redress. The benefit with this definition is that it 
neutralises the issue of eligibility from obstructing the ability of ‘innocent’ seriously inured 
victims from obtaining their compensation, as those victimised-perpetrators go through the 
panel or a specialised committee to decide such cases on the basis of a tariff. The experience 
of Peru is apt, where victimised-perpetrators were excluded and checks had to be made with 
every application whether the person were a member of an insurgent group, which had the 
effect of delaying for years reparations to all victims.138 
Remaining Challenges for a scheme  
The definition is likely to be the most contentious part of the pension bill, but there remain 
other challenges for such a programme. Although the pension law focuses on those who are 
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seriously injured, and deservedly so, other victims who are bereaved or suffered sexual 
violence should have access to some form of reparation, whether compensation or more 
symbolic measures. Other contexts such as Sierra Leone, Timor Leste and Kenya have 
recommended that reparations be prioritised for victims of those seriously injured and 
bereaved, such programmes have included tens of thousands victims and a range of violations 
to fully remedy the past rather than particular harms. In the Northern Ireland context, there 
are also considerations of section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 on obligations on 
public authorities to ensure due regard to equality of opportunity to disabled persons. Those 
victims excluded from the pension, such as those bereaved, may seek to be included through 
litigation, which may increase the cost and size of the programme if they are successful. 
Difficulties will also arise for those injured victims who are required to evidence that 
their harm was related to a Troubles-related incident. Some are likely to have medical 
evidence, but not all. WAVE proposes receipt of the money for injuries from the NI 
Memorial Fund or VSS as one possibility. Alternative arrangements of evidence should be 
put in place for the Commission for Victims and Survivors to assist victims in evidence 
collection through public records to ensure greater inclusion of those who are eligible. A 
further evidential problem, but also for the focus of redressing which harm, is whether or not 
those who suffered from psychological trauma as a result of a Troubles-related incident 
should be eligible. Including those with psychological injuries is likely to increase the number 
of eligible persons by thousands, and reducing the amount of money available to those who 
suffer from debilitating physical injuries. The NI Court of Appeal has held that, in relation to 
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, psychological injuries should be included for 
such a scheme where they are disabling. 139  However, as there is no requirement in 
international law to include psychological injured victims in pension or reparation laws, such 
individuals are perhaps better dealt with through the proposed Mental Trauma Service. 
Conclusion 
Reparations, while a worthy aspiration in redressing harm, often get bogged down in defining 
who is eligible and deserving of remedies. This article has attempted to provide some paths 
across the quagmire of contention around victimised-perpetrators. It is important to 
distinguish reparations from services that are currently used in Northern Ireland, with the 
former based on right or legal entitlement, acknowledging the wrongful act of the violence 
committed against the victim and vindicating their moral worth; whereas services are 
discretionary making victims dependents, rather than agents. This has important connotations 
for the framing of the pension bill for seriously injured victims, as work by WAVE and the 
CVSNI that have been pushing the pension has drawn from the experience of the 
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Employment and Support Allowance Regulations (NI) 2008 or the industrial accidents for 
extent of disablement. Such comparators should be useful in finding an appropriate amount 
but this was rejected in Argentina where compensation for victims was based on the pay of 
the highest ranked civil servant rather than the industrial accidents tariff, as such harm, 
particularly during the Troubles in NI, was not accidental, but rather arose from intentional 
political violence that should carry more serious connotations and more adequate 
reparations.140 Although reparations are usually based on responsibility in international law, it 
may cause some controversy to base the pension for injured victims in Northern Ireland on 
such a premise, given that the majority of violence was carried out by paramilitaries. That 
said reparations are adopted in many countries with multiple responsible actors, where the 
state takes the responsible to make reparations on the ground of social solidarity, with 
provisions that money paid out to victims is treated an indemnity against any perpetrators 
who is later convicted. More problematic is the crafting of a pension law in light of a wider 
transitional justice programme, including truth recovery and justice mechanisms. But without 
such complementarity accountability mechanisms, such money can be perceived as ‘blood 
money’ to pay off certain victim constituents and to give a good news story for politicians 
coming up to a NI Assembly election. As UN Special Rapporteur Pablo de Greiff recently 
stated,  
[in] order for something to count as reparation, as a justice measure, it has to be 
accompanied by an acknowledgment of responsibility and it has to be linked, 
precisely, with truth, justice, and guarantees of non-recurrence. Second, and as a 
consequence, recognizing the distinctive contribution that reparations can make to 
victims does not justify, either legally or morally, asking them –or anyone else—to 
trade off amongst the different justice initiatives.141 
 
A pension for seriously injured victims has been a long time coming, but resolution of this 
issue is not only a long overdue opportunity to alleviate the suffering of several thousand 
victims; it is also an opportunity to acknowledge and unpack the complexity of political 
violence and associated victimisation. 
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